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INTRODUCTION 
There is, perhaps, in our whole economic system no institu-
tion which has been so bitterly attacked and so stoutly defende 
as the stock exchange. Those who are employed in connection 
with it and those who make money on it (or hope to) extoll it as 
the typically American institution where opportunity waits to be 
grasped by the clever and aggressive. Reto~ers ot all types 
and their sympathizers condemn it as a gambling den and the cen-
ter ot seltish Wall street control ot the finances ot the na-
tion. To examine and evaluate all these points ot view being a 
work ot too wide a scope, the present writer will attempt to 
analyze only the more important ones. Those chosen are the fol-
lowing: the attitude of unqualified approval as represented by 
J. Edward Meeker, official economist and apologist of the New 
York Stock Exchange; the trankly critical view ot, tor example, 
John T. Flynn, the debunker of "benevolent big business and 
high tinance" mytha; and the more moderate and analytical view-
point ot Msgr. John A. Ryan, one ot the most outstanding Catho-
lic economists and ethicians. In the course of the work various 
other writers will be cited, but these three seem to represent 
extraordinarily well their respective schools ot thought, and 
taken together have put down all the principal arguments pro an 
contra the stock exchange. 
iv 
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In order to simplify this treatment and make it more 
definite, the New York Stock Exchange will be used to typify 
all the exchanges of the country, since it is the prototype and 
the one which all the others admittedly try to imitate. For-
eign exchanges have been excluded because their different 
methods of dOing bUsiness and their various positions in the 
financial life of their respective countries would only contuse 
the issue. However, mutatis mutandis, the main conclUsions of 
this thesis should apply to them also. Likwise, it was thought 
well to omit an analysis of the grain exchanges, and to contine 
the discussion solely to the stock market. This rule is fol-
lowed except in the consideration of short selling, where the 
hedging operations in grain throw considerable light upon the 
corresponding operations in stooks, by way both of similarity 
and of contrast. 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the stockexchang 
and its opera"t!iona from an ethical point ot view in order to 
determine whether or not they occupy a legitimate pOSition in 
our modern economic life. In this sor.t ot study it is neces .. 
sary, ot course, to proceed step by step, tirst analyzing the 
stock market ~ !!, determining whether or not it is a natural 
and necessary growth, or one which has been fostered tor the 
selfish interests of a few speculators. In the second chapter 
are considered two ot the most mooted practices ot the exchange 
margin trading and short selling. These, also, will be exam-
ined in themselves and without regard to the abuses to which 
vi 
they may have given rise. To adopt this procedure is not to 
deny the abuses whioh have undoubtedly orept in# nor is it to 
deny the neoessity or abolishing praotioes which, although good 
in themselves, have become hopelessly oorrupt. It is only when 
, 
things are distinguished rrom their misuse that a clear picture 
can be had or them, and judgment oan be made whether or not 
their abuse is inextricably linked with their use. In the 
third chapter this whole question or the abuse of stock ex-
change practices is taken up 1n the light or the work of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission. Many, with seemingly solid 
reasons, have urged that the stock e~hange be suppressed as a 
hopelessly corrupt inst1tut1on, whose members are too crarty 
and whose procedure is too complicated ever to be rerormed at 
all. The task, indeed, has been d1rr1cult and involved, but 
the Secur1ties and Exchange Commission has set about 1t w1th 
rearlessness and ardor, and the result is a good argument ror 
the rerormabi11ty of the exchange. In the rourth chapter are 
considered the wider economic and social imp11cations or wide-
spread speculation both berore and arter the advent or the SEC. 
No attempt will be made to treat in an exhaustive manner 
every eth1cal aspect of the exchange and its practices •. A mere 
glance at the rules and regulations or the SEC will make evi-
. dent the impossibi11t7 of such a course. Rather the attempt 
will be to examine thoroughly the more salient and disputed 
points and the larger aspects or the question. 
To one tra1ned in scholastic ph11osophy the lack or the 
vii 
terminology of the schools in an analysis professedly from 
the scholastic point of view may seem a bit disconcerting, but 
it is hoped that the necessary ideas are expressed clearly, 
even though they be in modern form. Since this thesis was writ-
ten not only tor scholars but also for the perusal of the "aver-
age" business man, it is expressed in terms which he will under-
stand, and its ethical judgments are based upon norms which he 
will admit. These norms, therefore, are rather proximate, and 
are not reduced to the more fundamental ones which might be 
termed more philosophical. Not for that reason, however, 
should they be any less valid and objective. One ot the tre-
quently used criteria, for example, is that of "naturalness". 
Since most economic operations are wholly indifferent in them-
selves, they must be judged mainly from their effects upon indi-
viduals or the community at aarge. Such are most processes 
which grow up, as it were, by reason of the very exigencies of 
the Situation, or in other words, in,a "natural" manner. An 
example of this would be the wholesale grocery business. The 
small retailer, occupied with his customers and buying in 
meager quantities, needs someone who can contact the large pro-
ducers, buy their goods in large quantities, and then break 
them up into small lots for distribution. Thus the wholesaling 
of groceries is a legitimate business because it grows up natur-
ally through an exigency ot the economic process of distribu-
tion, and because it benefits some and per!! injures none. The 
phrase "injures none" must be taken in the social as well as in-
viii 
dividual sense, since an institution which may provide a living 
for a number of individuals and may directly injure no one, may 
yet be an unnatural and harmful growth in the social body as a 
whole inasmuch as it may be wholly useless, and thus would re-
tain the energies ot its operators trom more socially usetul 
production. This is a charge commonly made against the stock 
exchange, and will be considered in detail in the last chapter. 
The word ·usetul" is to be taken merely in the sense of a 
means toward the attainment ot some good or indifferent end. 
And since the procuring of the means of livelihood for the in-
dividual and the expansion of production, especially in the 
modern world ot underconsumption and unemployment (speaking ot 
pre-war conditions), are good and deSirable, they are used as 
valid criteria in the ethical evaluation ot eeonomic institu-
tions and practices. 
Another method which should prove usetu1 toward making 
clear the essential nature ot the exchange and its practices 
and toward treeing them trom the obscurity arising from their 
complex nature, it to compare them with the more common and 
completely understood transactions ot daily business life, es-
pecially those whose legitimacy is never questioned. Thereby 
is eliminated the greatest difficulty under whicb controversy 
over the stock exchange labors -- a failure to grasp what is 
the state of the question. 
CHAPTER I 
THE STOCK EXCHANGE AS A MARKET 
In order to understand fully the nature of the stock ex-
change and its position in the economic set-up of today, it will 
clarify matters greatly to consider its origin and development. 
For this institution has grown so large and complex in the mere 
physical mechanism necessary to carryon its business that its 
essential nature has been greatly obscured except to the discern 
ing economist. Some have even condemned it on the score of com-
plexity alone, arguing that such an elaborate system of clerks, 
offices, tickers and other paraphernalia is uneconomic and 
wasteful for the simple transaction of transferring shares of 
stock. But a brief glance at the history of the exchange will 
reveal that all its present complexity, or at least the greater 
part of it, was introduced gradually by force of circumstances, 
and generally to prevent the creeping in of abuses. 
The institution known today as the New York Stock Exchange 
had its beginning on May 17, 1792 in an agreement signed by 
twenty-four brokers of New York City binding themselves to give 
preference to each other in their negotiations and to establish 
a minimum commission of one-quarter of one percent. At first 
all trading was done under an old buttonwood tree at 68 Wall St. 
and it was not until 1817 that a room was hired in which to 
1 
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conduct trading. As the volume or business increased, it was 
found necessary to replace the informal trades performed at the 
leisure of the individual brokers by having the President eall 
the various stocks singly from time to time in order that all 
wishing to trade in any particular stock might do so together 
and at the same time. The pre-Civil War expansion of the rail-
roads soon brought large issues of these securities to the 
Exchange, and constantly necessitated ever stricter and more 
elaborate procedure in handling the individual transactions. 
In 1867 the electric stock ticker was introduced to give 
speedier and more accurate quotation service both to New York 
City and, later on, to all the distant cities of the United 
states and Canada. In 1878, in order to allow of more rapid 
communication between members on the floor of the Exchange and 
brokers' offices, telephones were first installed, and simi-
larly, telegraph lines soon spread out from New York to all the 
1 
other centers or investment funds throughout the country. 
All these improvements, and many lesser ones;, devi sed by 
the business man's ingenuity aided by the advance or technolog~ 
at length produced an institution which is probably the most 
bewilderingly complicated of any in the modern economic world. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the amateur economist, 
overlooking the trading floor of the Exchange rrom the visi-
tors' gallery, and watching a thousand or more persons rushing 
----------
1 ;r. Edward Meeker, The Work of the Stock Exchange, Revised Ed., 
Ronald Press Co., New York, 1930, 63 sq. 
around like mad -- shouting quotations, waving hands, and 
dashing to the innmnerable telephones which line the walls 
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it is not surprising that such a person should decide that here 
is the simple economic transaction of exchange of goods gone 
mad with complexity, which, he may suspect, is contrived for 
the sole purpose of impressing and overwhelming the unsuspec-
ting investor. In a word, it looks more like a giant casino at 
Monte Carlo than a place for staid appraisal and evaluation of 
sound business enterprise. 2 
However, all this machinery of exchange has been found 
necessary to achieve what economists call the "perfect market", 
which is found nowhere else but in the organized exchange~. 
A perfect market is one in whioh there is always only one price 
for any given item at anyone time, and in which all buyers and 
sellers are in continuous oommunioation with one another, and 
have complete information ooncerning everything pertaining to 
3 
market conditions. The first condition is accurately ful-
filled on the stook exchange, although only in recent years was 
it able to devise a means of getting a uniform "opening" price 
on active securities. The second condition is in large measure 
fulfilled by the inter-city wire connections of the brokers. 
The individual buyer in a distant city has no personal contact, 
2---------For a detailed exposition and evaluation of the mechanics of 
Exchange operations, consult Meeker, OPe cit., Chapters I to 
VI, and XV to XVII. 
3 Fred R. Fairchild, Edgar S. Furniss, and Norman S. Buck, 
Elementary Economics, Macmillan Co., New York, 1926, I, 285. 
of course, with the one who sells to him, but his agent, the 
broker on the floor of the Exchange, is, as concerns every-
4 
thing pertaining to the market, in touch with every other buyer 
and seller. The third condition, that of complete knowlege of 
the market, can never be verified anywhere, but nowhere else 
are such comprehensive efforts made to keep participants in-
formed of market conditions. Passing over the periodic reports, 
which the Exchange requires to be published by all corporations 
, 
whose stocks are listed, we may mention the "ticker" serVice, 
which publishes every transaction over the whole country within 
ten minutes of its consummation. Thus, although the stock 
Exchange does not attain to all the requisites of a perfect 
market, "the closeness of the approach ••••• would surprise the 
uninitiated." 4 
These few considerations supply the basic material where-
with an approach can be made to the ethical position of the 
stock exchange in the modern American economic set-up. First 
of all, practically no one today will deny the legitimacy of 
the corporation in present-day society, and moreover, it is 
outside the scope of this study to establish such a legitimacy. 
It is not to be denied that drastic regulation and even reor-
ganization of big business may be necessary; but if private 
ownership is to remain a part of our national economy, it is 
difficult to see how it can be maintained except through the 
distribution of shares of stock into the hands of individuals. 
4 Ibid. 286. 
And most economists would say the wider the distribution 
the better. Wow, it is this wide distribution ot stock that 
calls tor some sort_ot market tor their exchange, tor the exer-
oise ot the right ot ownership includes the treedom to dispose 
ot all acquired holdings at will. 
So tar there appears no ditticulty. But the nature ot cor-
poration securities makes tor a kind ot market with which the 
average man, and even the average business man, is totally un-
acquainted in his daily commercial transactions. For shares ot 
stock ot the same ·class· in any given company are entirely and 
exactly homogeneous -- a condition which obtains in extremely 
tew markets in the world. '!'he metal, grain and commodity mar-
kets, it is true, trade in standard grades, but when it comes 
to actual delivery, allowances must be made tor variations trom 
the standard. And in ordinary commercial transactions, both 
wholesale and retail, variations in quality must be caretully 
watched tor and accurately appraised. Hence, the market tor by 
tar the largest number ot commodities and articles bought aDd 
sold in the business world, i8 conducted in a more or leas per-
sonal way, i.e., by contact at the buyer with the seller in 
such a way that the concentration ot all buyers and sellers 1n 
one place, especially tor continuous trading, is practically 
impossible. But the buying and selling ot corporation securi-
ties is entirely ditterent. Here, ant share ot General Motor. 
common stock is exactly identical with every other share ot the 
same stock, and so the buyer has merely to specity hi. preter-
ence and leave the rest up to his agent or broker. As a 
result of this characteristic, the bU7ers and sellers or cor-
poration shares have inevitab17 ~avitated to one place, where 
the bU7ers may most easily tind sellers, and sellers buyers. 
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Naturally, under this system or supply and demand, one at 
the distinguishing features ot the ·pertectU market is to be 
found -- that or only one price for any item at any given time. 
And it must be remembered that the word UperteetU is used here 
by the economist chiefly in an ethical sense; a perrect market 
is one in which a fair price is arrived at by tree competition 
among all participants, who all have equal and adequate know-
lege of market conditions. The centralized market, therefore, 
assures one condition ot a fair price -- that no one be charged 
more than another tor the same commodity at the same time. The 
justiticatioaof this feature of the stock exchange needs no 
further e1ucidatieD at this time from the viewpoint of the 
ethics or the just price. Its saving to the individual i. quite 
evident to the business man who must consume much time in com-
paring bids and prices before buying. Its social saving is 
sUfficiently deMonstrated by a consideration of the waste invol-
ved both in the -shopping around" of the wary and the inveigling 
of the unwary. 
One or the features ot the stock exchange, bowever, 'Which 
greatly obscures its economic function is that of its compli-
cated and e1aborate17 technical machinery ot operation, which 
tends to give the exchange the appearance ot a glorified Monte 
Carlo rather than the dign1ried air desirable in a rinancial 
institution, such as is round, ror example, in a large bank. 
7 
To investigate and justiry this maChinery would require the ser-
vices or a trained erricienoy expert, and henoe would rall out-
side the soopeor this thesis. Surrice it to say, that during 
the past thirteen years, when the exchange and its members, ror 
laok ot business, have been toroed to retrench to an extent 
whioh would have been believed Lmpossible in, the twenties, the 
number ot employees has been drastically out, but not one ot 
the departments was eliminated or oODso+idated. 
The next point to be oonsider&d 1s the organisation and 
control ot the Exchange, sinoe, although the legitimaoy ot the 
market itself may be beyond doubt, yet the particulars ot organ-
ization aDd business methods may be open to question. The New 
York Stock Exchange is an association ot some 1100 members, eaoh 
ot whom own. a ·seat" on the Exchange, and who may trade tor 
themselves exclUSively, or act as brokers tor others in several 
ditterent ways (each ot which will be oonsidered separately 
hereatter), or do both. The original agreement, signed in 1792, 
contained two prinoipal provisos -- that the contracting parties 
give each other preterence in their dealings, and that they 
adhere to a minimum commission. Since that time, the rules and 
regulations have expanded to inolude methods ot doing business 
and the treatment ot customers with regard to margins, state-
menta, eto., but the two original clauses are still the most 
important. The Exchange now prescribes a strict scale .ot com-
~-~------------------------------------------------------------~ 8 
missions from which no member may depart except under penalty, 
and has restricted the buying and selling of "listed" securities 
so as to prohiblt tradlng in them by lts members anywhere but 
on the floor of the Exchange. Such legislation practlcally es-
tablishes a pure monopoly slnce the effort and dlfflculty of 
finding a buyer for a certaln number of shares, especlally an 
·odd lot· (any fractlon of 100 shares), are practically insuper-
able. Here and there in outly1ng t1nancial centers there 1s a 
certain very small amount ot trading done "over the counter" 
(l.e., between 1nd1vidual and 1nd1v1dual or tirm and t1rm, but 
d1rectly and Dot through any organ1zed exchange), but generally 
the 1nconvenience 1s not worth the trouble ot making arrange-
ments as to de11very, payment and transfer ot stock, allot 
which are cared tor automatlcally by stock exChange regulat1ons. 
As has already been pointed out, the grav1tat10n of the 
buy1ng and selling ot corporat1on shares to one central market 
is quite nat~al and lnevltable, and 1t 1s but one more natural 
step to the control ot thls market by a monopo11stic association. 
To one who has watched' trading on the tloor of the Exchange, lt 
will be evident what a large amount ot bUsiness is handled by a 
comparatlvely small number ot men, and to one familiar with the 
procedure of buying and selling 1t wlll likewise'be evident 
what experlence and business integr1ty are necessary for the 
conduct ot the business. ~e varlous brokers gather around the 
·post· at which the particular stook in whioh they are inter-
ested is traded, and bid or otfer, as the case may be. Every 
trade is consummated b7 mere word ot mouth or even a nod o~ 
the head, which because ot the volume ot business to be done, 
is all that there is time tor. No written contract whatever is 
exchanged, aDd the onl7 check-up made is done at the clearing 
house when the slips turned in b7 bU7ers and sellers are matched 
against each other. The matching, however, is continuous thru-
out the da7, and in normal business times is accomplished ~th1D 
a halt-hour atter the trade is made. Such a procedure requires 
that each man allowed on the trading tloor be both responsible 
tor all the commitments whiCh he ma7 make, and experienced enoug~ 
to trade exped1tious17 and accurate17, since in the excitement 
which alwa7s characterizes operations it is ver7 eas7 to make a 
mistake. Theretore, the on17 "7 business can be done is b7 
means ot a h1gb17-restricted group; restricted in numbers in 
order to keep the total within what a reasonable trading area 
can supp17 space ~or, and restricted in tinancial standing to 
those who can turnish a bond (in the torm ot a deposit with the 
stock Clearing Corporation) sufticient to guarantee all their 
contracts. This latter provision is ot the utmost importance 
in a market which demands implicit confidence among its members, 
since trading is done with no discrimination ot persons. Even 
it one broker were suspicious ot the tinancial condition ot 
another, he could not b7 rule avoid doing business with him. 
The stock exchange, theretore, is ot necessit7 a pure monopol7 
and high17 exclusive organization, and onl7 as such can it 
sateguard and toster its own and the public interest. 
CHAPTER II 
MARGIN TRADING AND SHORT SELLING 
Two ot the most controverted practices on the exchange are 
short selling and buying on margin. Since short selling i8 also 
done "on margin", the buying transaction will be examined first. 
Throughout the discussion it must be kept in mind that the pur-
pose of this chapter is solely to establish the ethical nature 
of these practices ~ themselves, and not to consider their 
long-range social effects, or even to enter into the abuses 
which they may occasion. All that will be taken up later. 
Buying on margin, despite the esoteric connotation of the 
term, is basically a very simple, familiar, and accepted method 
1 
of financing a purchase throughout the commercial world. The 
purchaser buys some stock, makes a down payment, and then 
arranges with his broker for a loan with which to pay the seller 
in full, which must be done within two days, as all transactions 
on the exchange are for cash. The broker, of course, to protect 
his loan, requires'that there be a considerable "margin" betwee 
the current value of the stock and the amount of the loan. The 
exact size of the margin, before the days of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, depended upon the broker's experienced 
i-;;;-;-;~mplete discussion and evaluation of margin buying and 
short selling and their manifold implications, see Meeker, OPe 
cit., Chapter VII, ·Credit Transactions in Securities." 
10 
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judgment as to how likely the price ot the stock was to take 
a sudden tall. It the margin becomes too "narrow", the broker 
calls his customer for more security, which may be given in the 
torm of money or ot marketable stocks and bonds. Essentially, 
theretore, buying on margin is no different from bu71ng a home 
on a mortgage. In each case the owner must make over to the 
loaning agency full ti tle to his equity until the loan is re-
paid. It is true that the purchaser ot a home retains physical 
possession ot the property and that the buyer ot stock does not. 
But this ditference does not alter the identical nature ot the 
transaction, because there is no advantage in owning a home 
except in living in it. On the other hand, the only advantage 
in Owning stock is in receiving dividends trom it and in being 
able to dispose ot it at will, both ot which rights the pur-
chaser of stocks retains in full as long as his margin remains 
suffiCient. And the identity ot margin buying with other com-
mercial transactions accepted as unquestionably ethical i. more 
easily seen in the case ot the purchase of commodities or manu-
factured goods in large quantities where the loan is secured by 
warehouse receipts. In this latter case, the borrower receives 
absolutely no benetit trom the goods he buys until:the loan is 
repaid. 
It is surprising, theretore, to find that even an ordin-
arily well-intormed and s,mpathetic economist like Xsgr. Ryan 
m1sunderstand~ the stock exchange to the"extentot saying: 
When the buyer completes one ot these trans-
actions, he merely receives or pays out a 
sum based on the extent to which the price 
ot the goods in question has risen or tallen.2 
12 
In tairness to the author it must be noted that he i. speaking 
about purely speculative trades, and that as tar as the specu-
lator is tinancially concerned he might!! !!!! have done it 
that way, but the abuse ot a thing does not alter its essential 
position 1n the ethical scheme. The above quotation, then, as 
a statement ot tact is 1naccurate because every buyer must make 
a considerable deposit with his broker betore any purchase 1s 
made, and the broker must secure the tunds trom his own or some-
I body else's capital tor the balance, because he must pay tor the 
stock in tull within two days. It is true, he may call upon his 
customer tor more tunds it the stock should decline in price, 
but most speculators are more ready to sellout at a loss than 
to "throw in" more money on a declining market. Hence, in the 
ordinary transaction on the Exchange, the buyer, whether he 
makes money or loses, pays out money every time he buys and 
rece1ves money back every t1me he sells. 
The odium which surrounds the practice ot margin buying is 
perhaps due pr1m~1ly to the abuse made ot it by unscrupulous 
brokers and inexperienced investors and speculators, espec1ally 
during,the era ot the stock market "craze" in the late twenties. 
Added to this is the tact that the broker, although seeming to 
~-j;;;-A:-R7an, "The Koral Aspects ot Speculat10n", The Church 
and Socia11sm, University Press, Washington, D.C.,-quoted by 
~F. teibell, Readings 1n EthiCS, Loyola Un1versity Press, 
Chicago, 1926, SIB. --
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act only as a buJing agent, is also a banker in the transaction, 
and in this double and complex function seems to recall to the 
ethician the many evasions practiced under cover ot the old 
contractus Germanicus. But the comparison is not to the point, 
as the latter was excogitated for the express purpose ot circum-
venting ethical norms, whereas the former is a natural and con-
venient operation. It would be perfectly agreeable to the 
broker tor his customer to take the stock which he had bought, 
bring it to his commercial bank, secure a loan on it, and then 
pay the broker in full for the stock. But there are obviously 
several inconveniences which are obviated by the standard and 
universal practice. The broker, because of his specialization 
in the business, can make something on interest and carrying 
charges while still charging his customer less than he would 
have to pay at a bank, and the customer is saved the trouble and 
expense invol ved in securing a loan. Buying on margin, then, is 
t.-
nothing more than mo~tgaging the s\1.curi ties one has bought. It 
is more dangerous because of the rapid .nd extreme fluctuations 
in security prices, and because it can be abused by unscrupulous 
brokers allowing customers to buy on too thin a margin. But 
betore they advocate extermination, economists should try regu-
lation, which has been instituted by the SEC and whose success 
will be examined later. Even a clever "bucket shop" operator 
would not dare to have his customers "receive or payout a sum 
based on the extent to which the price ot the good has risen or 
fallen." That would be too obvious, since a bucket shop must 
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try to present as nearly as possible the appearance ot a 
bona tide broker's office. To require little or no margin would 
--
not only decrease this appearance ot similarity, but would also 
bring less money into the owner's pocket. 
Much more than buying on margin, short selling has been 
criticized and condemned -- and rightly so. Margin buying may 
rightly be considered as a financial practice necessary to 
enable all but the very richest to obtain an interest of owner-
ship in the productive enterprises ot the nation -- an end which 
practically all economists advocate as a means of preventing the 
further undue concentration of economic power. But the justi-
tication ot short selling is neither so easy nor so obvious, and 
the misuse which has been made of it, particularly in the 
"Crash" ot 1929, was devastating in its results. But here 
again, the analogy between Short selling on the exchange and 
other commercial transactions which no one ever thinks of ques-
tioning is sntflclently close to glve great plausibility to a 
plea tor its legltimacy, and on the grain exchange it i8 a 
method of eliminating risk which the great flour milling com-
panies claim they could not otherwise bear. 
Short selling has been defined as "selling something you 
don.t own". From a certain aspect this is true, and to the lay-
man making a short sale 1t1sjust .!! if he we:re sel11ng some-
thing he did not own. But the philosophy ot .!!! ~ is ha:rdly a 
Scientific one. P:rom the legal viewpoint the transaction is 
an enti:rely diffe:rent one. A short sale, like any othe:r sale, 
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1s a contract to de11ver at a spec1fied time certain goods, 
tor which payment will be received; but in this case the seller 
does not have the goods which he is going to deliver. In order 
to analyze ful17 this type of transaction, it will be necessary 
to consider the grain exchanges also, since it is in those mar-
kets that the short sale is used most extensively and has its 
widest economic importance.3 There, too, are found certain 
differences in the method of settling a short sale which will 
help materially toward the understanding of its true nature. 
\ 
On the grain exChange the contract always calls for a delivery 
date several months away (except, of course, in the case ot 
"cash" grain, which offers no difficulty and which is subject 
to no controversy). The short seller may fulfill his contract 
by bU71ng actual (cash) gra1n:!.n time for the SPecified delivery 
date, or he may buy another contract before that time and allow 
the two to cancel out through the mechanism of the exchange. 
The latter is b7 far the most common method of closing out the 
speculative short sale. A short sale,' therefore, trom the 
juridical point of viewturns out to be nothing more than a con-
tract for a future delivery of grain. The prevalence ot such 
contracts in the commercial world need hardly be indicated. 
The construction or manutact~ing company whose bid is accepted 
for a government contract is selling short, since it is promis-
3 For a complete exposition and discussion ot "hedging" in 
grain, consult Ray,mond T. Bye, Principles ot Economics, 3rd 
Edition, F. S. crotts and Co., lew York, lV!5, lSl sq. 
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ing to deliyer certain goods.1D the tuture, the raw materials 
tor which it does not yet own. But the classic case is the 
magazine which accepts perpetual .ubscriptions: the manageme.t 
undertakes to supply paper made trom tree. which have not 7et 
e~en .tarted to growl Thi8 i8 selling short with a Tengeance. 
Since these eontracts are to be considered legitimate, the short 
sale oathe e2Change must al.o be approved unle.s it can be fur-
ther proved un&eces.ary or harmful. The economic tunction per-
tormed b7 the or41nary contract tor tuture deliveP7 of goods not 
yet own .. i. ':GbY1oua in the ca •• of manutactures, where the 
product 1.s 'to De improved through an intermediar)' proce... And 
it is equallteY14ent in the.case ot the wholesaler who does not 
change the~·good811l a physical way, because he gives them "time 
and place ,.~1.1i'tt.s", which are of equal value in the economic 
wor14 •. BlI:s '1t.is claimed that the speculator who trades on the 
exchange, .. ci·nevel' owns so much as a Single bushel' ot wheat, 
pertorms DO e4onomb, .ervice whatsoever. Ignoring tor the time 
being the. specu1ato.,~s. part 111 maintaining a tluid market where 
the advent or a luge oreler ,1'»_ a tlour mill will not send 
prices rocketing,~1J. 'wil.l examine on17 his parb in making pos-
sible the "hedgtDc" operations by which all big handlers ot 
grain insure themselves. against undue 108S. 
The supply of wheat"'eing highly seasonal, it i. necessary 
tor elevator and tlour mill owners to buy up and store grain tar 
in,advance ot its aotualconsumption. This meaas that in addi-
tion to the usual risks ot business .- the constant daniel' ot 
1'1 
total loss b~ explosion and fire, the possibilit~ of 108B 
ot customers through competition, business depression, etc. 
there is the additional and immense risk of a drastic decline 
in grain prices, which means a corresponding drop in the price 
of flour. To predict and provide for this contingenc~ i8 beyonc 
the capacities of an~ economist, save perhaps the most able, 
since it would require an intimate knowlege of the world market 
in grain, besides the political acmnen requi·red to foresee wars, 
trade barriers, etc. Therefore, the dealer in grain, just as 
he insures hi8 plant and equipment against fire, so he insure a 
the value ot his commodities in the only way he can -- b~ 
hedging. A hedging operation cons1sts 1n selling short on the 
grain exchange, the Ch1cago Board of Trade, for example, a quan-
tity corresponding to the actual grain bought and stored awa~ 
in an elevator. The "delivery" date ot the short sale should 
also correspond roughly to the consumption date ot the grain on 
hand. Thus, 1t a miller should bU7 a hundred thousand bushels 
ot wheat in Augaat to keep his m1il g01ng throughout the ensuing 
twelve months, he would sell short on the Board ot Trade, say, 
titt~ thousand bushels ot "December" wheat and tifty thousand ot 
"Ka,." wheat. Then, i~ the price should decline, he will make up 
on his short 8ale What he loses on his stock on hand, and if the 
price should rise, he will gain on his elevator supply what he 
loses on the short sale. In pricing his tlour he must always 
use the current price tor wheat as a base, since there are al-
wa"s some millers bu,.ing at current prices for immediate m1lli~ 
The importance ot this torm ot protection can readily be 
gauged trom the widetluctuation in grain prices even 1n 
nnormaln years, a t1uctuation more than sufficient to wipe out 
all the ordinary protits ot regular business. The short sale in 
grain is, then, a means ot passing on the abnormal risks ot 
business to those who can undertake to bear it -- speculators. 
But at this point Msgr. Ryan object. that 
••• traders in produce should take the risk 
ot t1uctuating prices themselves. • •• there 
aeems to be no good reason why the capable 
dealer or manufacturer could not acquire a 
a sutticient amoWlt ot ••• knowlege and 
toresight. To set apart a body ot men tor 
the sole purpose ot dealing in riska seems 
to be carrying the principle ot division 
ot labor unnecessarily tar ••• 4 
However, the miserable tailure ot the very best tinancial and 
economic ftservicesn, with their highly trained and experienced 
economista, to~orecast business and price trends with anything 
approaching accuracy, i8 sufticient testimony to the imposs.i-
bility ot the average business man's acquiring the necessary 
"know1ege and toresight·. And sufticient toresight would have 
to be very considerable, since in a bighly competitive and over-
built industry like milling, the margin ot protit is so small 
that a 108s ot a tew cents a bushel on the total amount handled 
in one year might well be disastrous, even to the most stable. 
As tor the statement that a separate body ot men tor the carry-
ing ot risks is supertluous, there is the unquestioning accep-
tance ot the indispensable economic tunction ot the large 1nsur-
4----------Ope cit., 520 
9 
ance companies. However much they may be accused of over-
charging or ot accumulating undue tinancial control over the 
nation, they are never considered unnecessary as a class tor 
bearing or distributing the more abnormal risks ot businesa, 
such as tire, thett, etc. It is, of course, conceivable that 
another method ot handling the risk ot commodity price fluctu-
ations could be devised, but the fact that no enterpriser bas 
yet ventured into the field should be evidence ot its impractic 
ability. !he greatest difficulty is that grain price changes 
equalize themselves (or could be made to do so from the poin.t 
ot view of the insurance man) only over a period of several 
years, and hence any attempt to handle such insurance would re-
quire immense reserves ot capital, and would lack that steady 
income which the business man requires. All other forma ot 
insurance can be made to equalize receipts and payments every 
year. 
Hedging by means ot the short sale, therefore, must be con-
sidered a necessit"s- ot modern commercial procedure.5 It is no 
pertect, and almost ot necessity gives rise to numerous abuses, 
which, bowever, may be mitigated by proper regulation. The 
necessity and effectiveness ot governmental regulation will be 
considered later; the point to be no~ed here is that !! itsel[ 
short selling on the Board ot Trade is a necessary and pertectl 
.. -----.... _-
5 Here the objection might validly be raised that it is this 
very short selling and consequent speculation which causes th 
price fluctuations against which hedging is necessary. There 
is much to be sald tor this pOint ot view, and it will be con 
sidered at length in the tourth chapter. 
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legitimate praotioe. 
But short selling on the stook exchange is a slightly dit-
ferent matter because ot a certain oomplioation in the matter ot 
handling it. The short sale in grain is always "oovered" by a 
purohase ot some sort, and ot course, the person who sells stook 
short expects eventually to buy back what he bas sold, but 
actual delivery ot the stock sold is made to the buyer, not by 
purchasing stock to give him, but by borrowing it. ~he reason 
tor this discrepancy in practioe between the two types ot ex-
ohange is that speculation in oommodities is always 1D. "tutures", 
1.e., in contracts tor delivery at a date some months in the 
tuture, whereas oorporate securities are traded tor immediate 
delivery, i.e., within a tew days. Henoe it can readily be seen 
that there would be no use in selling short it one had to bU7 
back almost immediately in order to make delivery to the pur-
ehaser. Instead, the Short seller or his broker goes to the 
loan market and "borrows" the necessary amount ot stock, atter 
having put up an equal value ot collateral. Ordinarily, the 
loaner ot the stook eharges no turther premium than the use ot 
the money during the period ot the loan. ~hen, when the short 
seller wishes to "eover", he buys back his stoek in the open 
market, and with this purohase returns the number ot sbares bor-
rowed. Portunately for the speoulator, one share ot a partieu-
lar class ot stock in a given company is as good as any other, 
so he 1s not at all bound to return the identioal oertificates 
borrowed. 
In the eth1cian's eftort to determine the legit1mac7 of 
this transaction_ he does not tind that clear economic necessit7 
that obtains in the case ot the short sale in grain. Por the 
sole benet1t to the economic s7stem which the short seller in 
stocks is sa1d to confer 1s the more dub10us one ot maintain1ng 
a stead7 market and of equalizing pr1ces. As this cla~ will be 
weighed and judged 1n a later chapter_ the discuss1on, tor the 
present, will be limited to the intrinsic aspect ot the trade. 
Although the parallel which was drawn between the short 
sale of gra1n and other very common and accepted commero1al 
transactions can also be used here 1n a limited manner, since 
merchants frequently have to borrow to complete contracts, 7et 
the argument does not have the same torce because ot the Pure17 
speculative 1ntent1on ot the seller. He is not required to sell 
short b7 an7 exigency ot his business, and doubtless does not 
venture upon such a dangerous course ot action sole17, or even 
primari17, from a sense ot his public duty to. check the advance 
of an over-accelerated market. And there is no doubt that the 
short sale has been used tor selfish and criminal ends ever 
since its appearance on the exchange. The extent ot the abuse 
ot short selling oannot be estimated, even approximate17, since 
all the evidence ot its use is locked in private a~ch1ves. But 
there can be little doubt that the precipitano7 ot the decline 
ot the stock market in the autumn ot 1929 and its accompan71ng 
contusion and ruin were due to the large-scale and premeditated 
action of operators who cared much for their tinancial aggrand-
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izement and little tor the public weal. O~anted tbat 
deflation was needed, and needed badly, yet it should have been 
brought about in some other way less drastic and less like~y to 
undermine the morale .of the people and their leaders. 
However, on the other hand, it is very difficult to con-
demn short selling on its own intrinsic nature. Therefore, tor 
the present, we will have to confine ourselves to saying that on 
the stock exchange it is a practice of doubtful utility and of 
very dangerous possibilities, which perhaps should be abolished 
entirely, or at least closely regulated if it can be shown to 
have a certain general benefit in the just determine ot security 
prices. These matters will be more fully investigated later. 
CHAPTER III 
REGULATION OF THE STOCK MARKET 
During the course of its long existence, the stock exchange 
has been continually decried as an unhealthy center of gambling 
and wild speculation in the weltare and integrity of the nation. 
Most of the opposition has been undertaken in a crusading spirit 
and has based its demands for the suppression or drastic regu-
lation of the exchange more upon emotion than upon sober reason-
ing. Two notable exceptions to this statement are the investi-
gations-of the Hughes Commissionl of 1909 and the Pujo Commit-
tee2 of 1912. The latter committee, while admitting the neces-
sity and usefulness of a national stock exchange, brought forth 
as its principal criticism the large turnover of stocks listed 
on the New York Stock ExChange.3 For example, there changed 
hands during the course of the year 1911, over thirty-one mil-
lion shares of General Motors stock, even though the entire 
number of shares outstanding at that time was barely over five 
million. And Since, no doubt, a large proportion of those 
1 "The Governor's Committee on Speculation in Securities and 
Commodities", appointed by Governor Hughes of Bew York State 
to investigate local conditions. 
2 Otherwise known as the "Money Trust Investigation", who.e 
report was made to the United States Senate Committee on 
Banking and Currency. 
3 Wall street Journal, Dec. 7, 1912, quoted in Van Antwerp, 
W!rriam C., The stock EXChan!e from Wi thin, Doubleday, Page 
and Co., Garden cIty, 1914, 77:---
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shares never changed hands at all, the ratio ot turnover on 
the rest was still higher. Certain17, this tact would strike 
one immedlately as lndlcatlng a tar too large speculatlve ele~ 
ment ln that stock unless good reason could be glven for It. A 
commentator ln the Wall street Journal glves hls justlflcatlon, 
whlch ls presumably the one current ln the "Street". 
The ratl0 of slx to one suggests healthy 
actlvlty ln the market ••• It ls concelvable 
that a block ot stocks may pass through many 
hands before lt arrlves at lts ultlmate owner, just as a crop ot potatoes passes through a 
long chaln ot handlers and buyers and dealers 
before lt reaches the ultimate consumer • 
• eant~e the number of potatoes has nelther 
lncreased nor dlminlshed. But the potato crop, 
whlch easl1y changes hands six times a 7ear, 
ls flnally eaten. The stocks go on forever. 
The legltimate holder ls not injured if they 
change hands not slx, but sixty"times, pro-
vlded he i. secured by proper publiClty, 
which the stock Exchange assures. 
Thls quotation is given at length to show the type of 
reasonlng whlch even an "enllghtened" and semi-otficlal apology 
may make use ot. !here ls no doubt that a ratio of slx to one 
shows activlty, but whether this activity ls healthy or not ls 
the whole point at lssue, and the parallel with potatoes ls not 
entirely to the polnt. Flrst of all, the present system ot dis-
trlbutlng potatoes 1. not to be held up as an ldeal in the econ-
omic system, and ln fact economlsts have not ceased to decry the 
enormous wastes ln distrlbutlng produce in general. secondly, 
lt may concelvably be necessary that potatoes pass through so 
man7 hands ln order to be handled efflclently. Here the ques-
------~--~ 4 Ibid. 
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tion i8 -- must stocks be traded that often before they reach 
the hands of permanent investors' It is true that the stock-
holder who bas his certificates safely put away in his deposit 
box is not injured directly by speculation on the exchange, but 
the social cost of maintaining an institution ot the size ot the 
New York Stock ExChange solely or primari17 tor selfish specu-
lation muat a180 be considered. The objection of the Pujo Com-
mittee was left unanswered, but its soundnes8 is amply demon-
strated by the tact that later condemnation of the exchange has 
generally been on the charge ot over-expansion. 
The commission apPOinted by Governor Hughes three years 
betore the more comprehensive and general Pujo investigation, 
made a thorough study of the New York Stock Exchange, and pro-
duced a leDgthy, but very moderate, report. Here again, the 
chiet objection was the over-expansion of speculation. 
The problem, wherever speculation is strongly 
rooted, is to eliminate that which is wastetul 
and morally destructive, while retaining and 
allowing tree play to that which is beneticial. 
The 4itticulty in the solution ot the problem 
lies in the virtual impossibility ot distinguish-
ing what ia practically gambling trom legitimate 
speculation. The most truittul policy will be 
tound in measurea which will lessen speculatlon 
by persons not qualified to engage in it. In 
carrying out such a polley, exchanges can 
accomplish more than legislatures. 5 
The Committee turther blames the Exchange tor not havlng real-
ized its obllgations sooner, but places confidence ln it by 
opposing the publlc demand tor incorporation in order to give 
5 Report ot the Governor's Committee, quoted in Van Antwerp, 
OPe Cit., 415 sq. 
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the governing committee ot the Exchange tul1 jurisdiction 
over its members. Such control would, of course, be lacking in 
a corporation, whose members could make use ot an injunction 
against the Exchange. 
In common with most American business men, the members ot 
the stock exchanges ot the country have been very slow to re-
cognize the extent ot their moral obligations toward societ,. as 
a whole, and theirs perhaps is a greater guilt in proportion as 
their re.ponsibilit,. is greater than the average. But it must 
not be supposed that the Exchange had done nothing betore 1909. 
As early as 1869 the New York Stock Exchange had required all 
corporations whose stocks were listed to register their issues 
with independent banks or trust companies in order to obviate 
any possibility ot traudulent over-issue. About the same time 
tull and instantaneous publicity was inaugurated tor all trans-
actions by the installation ot the ticker s,.stem; and all stocks 
granted the privilege ot tull ftlistingft, in contradistinction 
to the smaller -unlistedft department, had to be thorough1,. in-
vestigated by a special Committee on stock List betore being 
approved. However, the Hughes Comm.i.ssion went turther in advo-
cating that the Excnange require more complete, extensive, and 
trequent tinancial and operating reports trom the corporations 
concerned. Although the response to this advice may not have 
been as prompt as the Commission might have deSired, it was 
steady and progressive enough to lead Protessor W. Z. Ripley to 
assert in 1926 --
Beyond peradventure of doubt the N. Y. stock 
Exchange is today the leading influence in 
the promotion of adequate corporate disclosure 
the world over. Its evident disposition to 
accept fully the responsibilities of its 
status ••• merits high praise.6 
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The Hughes COmmission made several other minor recommen-
dations, but, as mentioned previously, advocated no radical 
legislation, and left things pretty much up to the Exchange mem-
bers themselves. One ot the reasons tor this attitude seems to 
have been a lack ot tamiliarity with Exchange operations on the 
part ot the members ot the COmmission, or perhaps a certain lack 
ot ingenuity which would enable them to proscribe undesirable 
practices without thereby prohibiting the desirable ones. Cer-
tain it is that the rules of the present Securities and Exchange 
Commission evince a complete grasp of the mechanism of stock 
market technique and a great cleverness in directing it along 
its due course. 
The next great investigation ot the Exohange was undertaken 
at the instance ot President Roosevelt in 1933. Whatever praise 
might have been dealt out to the Exchange betore 1929, even by 
such a disinterested economist as Protessor Ripley, everyone 
admitted that the debacle ot that year proved that another 
attempt should be made at retorm. Perhaps the blame should not 
be put upon everyone ot the members and operators of the Ex-
change, but it seemed that many ot them had acted Violently 
anti~soclally. In launching his comprehensive investigation of 
6 Main street and Wall street, Little,. Brown and Co., Boston, 
~,210. --
the securities business in all its aspects, the President 
enunciated a new principle of business. 
This proposal adds to the ancient rule of 
caveat emptor, the turther doctrine "let the 
seiier a1so beware". It puts the burden of 
telling the whole truth upon the seller. It 
Should give impetus to honest dealing in 
securities and thereby bring back public 
contidence.7 
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This statement reters to the Securities Act ot 1933, but it also 
meant a new era in the stock market. The Securities. Exchange 
Act of 1934, based upon a most thorough investigation, created 
the Securities and Exchange Commission to administer both Acts, 
closely related as they are. ~s action was a complete rever-
sal of the attitude ot the Hughes Commission. No longer was 
complete reliance placed upon the public spirit of the Exchange 
and its ability to correct abuses, and no longer was the govern-
ment considered inadequate to deal with the problem. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was given 
almost complete control over the stock markets ot the country, 
and at once proceeded to put in torce the provisions ot the Act, 
and to use the discretionary powers accorded to it. It is the 
purpose ot this chapter, then, to consider how it has handled 
each ot the major problems with which it was confronted. The 
first specitic problem to arise was that ot trading on margin. 
As was demonstrated in the preceeding chapter, it is very difti-
cult to condemn this practice absolutely, since it seems just as 
7 Federal Securities Act,"Hearings betore the Committee on In-
terstate and ForelgiiComaerce ot the House ot R.presentativea~ 
U. S. Government Printing Ottice, Washington, D.C., 1933, 1. 
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much a natural and constitutional right to buy securities 
by means of a loan as to purchase a home in the same way. More-
over, the customer is more likely to get favorable terms from 
his broker than from his banker. The chief 'danger of margin 
bU7ing is that ot trading on too thin an equity, and it was froll 
this angle that the SEC attacked it. In the Act itself the fol-
lowing limitations were made: 
For the initial extension of credit, an 
amount not greater than whichever is the 
higher of --(1) 55 per centum of the current market 
price of the security, or 
(2) 100 per centum of the lowest market 
price of the security during the pre-
ceeding thirty-six calendar months, 
but not more than 75 per centum ot the 
current market price. 8 
In other words, the investor or speculator must ·put up" at 
least 25.per cent of the current market price, and is sometimes 
required to pay up to 45 or even 75 per cent -- a rather cau-
tious and conservative regulation in view of the Hughes Commis-
sion recommendation that the Exchange use its influence to pre-
vent members trom "generally accepting business on a less margin 
than 20 per cent." The clause referring to the lowest price 
within the past three years is added to differentiate between 
the more speculative, and therefore volatile, shares and the 
more conservative investments. A stock, for example, which baa 
never gone below 70 per cent of its present value may be pur-
chased upon a margin of only 30 per cent, whereas one which has 
declined to, say, a third of the current quotation within the 
-----------8 Securities Exchanae Act of 1934, 7. 
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preceeding three years requires a margin or 45 per cent. The 
wisdom ot this regulation is perfectly obvious, and in ract 
similar policies had long been rollowed by the more conservative 
houses, and had even been enforced to a limited extent by the 
Exchange itself. The Exchange possesses sufticient sanction 
with regard to 1ta members in the power to suspend their expen-
sive memberships temporarily or permanently, and has otten had 
recourse to such a drastic measure. Yet the SEC rul1ng artords 
add1t1onal motivation by rendering the culpr1ts liable to pro-
aecut10n by the Federal courts. Moreover, the SEC 1s further 
empowered to revise these requirements "up or down" as circum-
stances and the cond1tion of the money and secur1ty markets may 
require. The advantages ot this latter prov1sion are Ivery im-
portant. Had the Commiss1on existed in 1929, stock prices might 
not have reached nearly so high a level, and the consequent fall 
m1ght not have been so sudden and disastrous. For When securitJ 
prices had beg~ to exceed all reason and to "discount" the fu-
ture tor ten prosperous years, margin requirements could have 
been raised to prevent further commitments and to keep prices 
on a rairly sate level. 
One ot the reasons tor the magnitude of the crash of 1929 
was that very ma~ brokerage accounts were carried on such a 
slender margin that as soon as the market declined appreciably, 
the brokers were rorced to call for more margin. Since this 
could not readily be supplied, they had to throw their clients' 
holdings upon the market to be sold at any price that could be 
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gotten. A strictly-enforced rule ot adequate margins would 
bave obviated the worst aspects of the debacle by preventing the 
initial over-expansion of the market through a reduction in the 
eftective purchasing power ot the speculator's original deposit. 
In addition, the small investor could have been dissuaded from 
trading at all, since many such never become confirmed "addicts· 
until they are able to buy and sell in "round lots· (multiple. 
of 100 shares), which they could do only if margin requirements 
were low. Then, when the break in the market did come, specu-
lative accounts would have been more ready to withstand the 
sudden assault of the "bears·, and would have had sufficient 
time to be bolstered up. Finally, after the decline, the Com-
mission could have lowered margin requirements with satety, and 
thus encouraged the entrance of further buying power into the 
market. Such flexibIlity, akin to the operation of the redis-
count rate in the money market, was entirely lacking in 1929, 
when it was most needed. Of course, the intelligent use of this 
power of control would have required trained and sagacious econ-
omists, but, as 1s evidenced by the raising of the rediscount 
rate early in 1929, they were not entirely laCking in that 
frenzied era of expansion. Tbtt action was taken mainly with a 
view to curbing the stock market, but since the effect was only 
indirect, except perhaps psychologically, the results were 
scarcely noticeable. BeSides, what handicap was it to have to 
pay one or two per cent more for the money borrowed, if the 
principle could be doubled within a few months? Suoh was the 
view of the optimistic speculator. 
The effect, then, of this provision on margin regulation 
is to reduce-speculation as a whole, and to protect by elimina-
tion the small speculator, who needs protection most, since pre-
sumably he is less able to bear his occasional, or inevitable 
<as some would have it), losses. It goes further in eliminating 
some of the undesirable speculation by preventing the more 
daring large operators from bringing additional instability into 
the mar~et by their own precarious margins. But comparatively 
little was done to distinguish and quadlthat speculation which 
is "practicall7 gambling" -- which was the principal objective 
of the recommendations of the Hughes Commission. The next 
chapter will inquire into that speculation which, for lack ot 
very obvious good or evil ettects, may be called useless or 
parasitic. For the present, evil speculation may mean that 
which produces detinitely injurious etfects. 
In its regulation ot short selling the SEC has shown a re-
markable insight into the technical operations ot the Exchange, 
as well as a good deal ot clever ingenuity in regulating them 
according to ethic.1 norma. As was pointed out in the previous 
chapter, the chief objeet!on that can be raised against short 
selling is not so much the illegitimacy of the practice itself, 
but rather the harmful use to which i~ has been put. When a 
small investor, deciding that a certain stock is selling far 
above its worth, sells it short, he exerts a beneticial etfect 
upon the market (if his judgment is correct) inasmuch as his 
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sale tends to keep the price from rising further. Moreover, 
if he is fortunate and the atock declines fairly rapidl,.., hia 
buying back of the shares sold short has a bolstering effect on 
the stock. In the same manner and in proportion, the large 
operator trading in the same way has an equalizing and steadying 
eftect upon the market. But the short sale, especial17 in the 
hands ot one or more men with ample resources at hand, can be 
used with disastrous ettect to ftbreakft the market. When a pow-
erf'ul ftbearft or group ot beara perceives that the market ia 
ftthinft i. a particular stock (i.e., there are f'ew buying order a 
immediate17 below the current price), he or they may attempt to 
break the price, and by means of' the short sale to reap a con-
siderable gain at tbe expense of' others. 
First of all, the bear sells any ot tbe stock which he may 
happen to own, and perhaps also a good number ot shares short. 
Since the market tor that stock is already thin, it begins to 
decline, but the bear still gets a f'airly good price for hia 
aales. Then, When he deems the moment opportune, he plunges in 
and starta to hammer down prices by ottering to sell to any bu,-
er at any price -- the lower the better. Immediately the price 
alumps badly in 1Dcreasing trading, ever,.. broker in the country 
begins examining the accounts of' all his customers who hold tbat 
security, and many calla tor more margin are sent out. All this 
may take place wi thin a half'-hour, and if' the decline is rapid 
enough, numerous speculators will be notitied by telephone to 
place additional aecurity tmmediately to strengthen their 
account with their broker.. Inevitabl,. there will be aome 
unable to comp17 with these margin calls, and their entire ac-
count. will have to be aold out at the price obtainable at the 
moment, thus turther depressing the market. The ettect ot the 
initial decline, theretore, is cumulative, and ma7 easil,. turn 
into a paDic. Meanwhile, the bear, once the decline is well 
under wa,. and DlOving ot its OWl'l. momentum, ceases selling and 
tries to determine the point at which the bottom'will be reach~ 
There he buys back, as covert17 as he can, all the shares he baa 
sold ahort, and perhaps he may even "go long" again, realizing 
a handsome protit on the whole transaction. 
ot course, it must not be assumed that suCh bear operations 
are eas,. or intallible means ot making mone,.. On the contrar,., 
they are very dangerous, and require great ahrewdnesa and daring 
as well as much good luck. In the tirst place, it is ditticult 
to tind out when the market i" thin. Then, at al11' point ill the 
decline new bU7iJlg orders may come rushing in, and ma,. even turn 
the course ot prices in the opposite direction, leaving the bear 
operator with a heavy loss. But bear raids on the stock market 
have been ot trequent occurrence throughout its histor,., and 
the,. are particularl,. tatal when the raid is upon the whole list 
ot stocks simultane.usl,. and by a determined and wealthy group 
ot men pooling their resources. To distinguish a minor bear 
raid trom a tortuitoua conjunction ot order. ot the same kind 
is ordinarily ver,. difficult, and has led common financial new. 
parlance to ascribe ever7 rise or fall in prices to bull or bear 
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action.9 At t~es there can be no doubt about it. The most 
famous and disastrous bear raids took place during October and 
November ot 1929, When with the average day's trading around 
four million shares, sixteen million were traded on a single d 
The catastrophic results ot this sudden tall ot prices needs no 
development here. Drastic liquidation doubtless was needed, but 
coming as it did, it ruined many by the annihilation ot their 
purchasing power, and destroyed the general confidence not only 
in the stock exchange but also in the very foundations ot our 
national economic lite. 
To the task ot preventing any ~.petition of such a debacle 
the SEC set itself. As alread,. in41cated, the problem is not 
how to el1a1nate all short selling, since some of it is undoubt 
ed1y beneticia1, but how to prevent the breaking of the market 
through short sales. This was solved by prohibiting the short 
sale ot an,. security --
(1) 
(2) 
below the price at which the last sale 
thereot, regular way, was e1'tected ••• or 
at such price unless such price is above 
the next prece~41ng 41fterent price at 
Which a sale ot such security, regular 
wa7, was etfected ••• 10 
(Refular wal means "long" stock, i.e., stock 
ac uall,. owned.) 
Furthermore, all orders in the future were to be marked either 
"long" or "short", and no~~ker could execute an order not so 
marked. The etfeot ot this regulation was to make very ditfi-
-- .. --~- .. --
9 It is now an established, it unfortunate, facon ~ parler. 
10 Securities and Exchange Commission, General Rules and Regula-
tions under!!! Securities ~ Exchange Ict,1941,~ol. 
cult any kind of short selling during a declining market, 
and to practically prohibit the breaking of the market except 
with "long" stock. The ingenious effectiveness of these two 
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rules, especially the second, haa been quite remarkable. If 
only the first were in force, a bearish operator could begin to 
break prices with a hundred shares of long stock, and then fol-
low through with as much Short stock as would be bid for, using 
his long stock only on each initial lowering of the price. But 
when the ahort sale must be above the prece,ding higher price 
(in a declining market), his usual technique is impossible. 
Of course, where enough resources can be pooled to start a 
decline which will continue of its own momentum, breaking the 
market with long stock will still be profitable, but this is an 
extremely dangerous practice, and one which repays little for 
the huge risk involved. Moreover, the SEC has other ways ot 
dealing with suCh large-scale piracy. As soon as any unusual 
activity has occurred in any stock, all the brokers involved are 
immediately requested to turnish the names of buyers and seller. 
to the CommiSSion, which can then prodeed against the ottender. 
on the charge ot manipulation of prices. Up until 1933 the 
common practice ot every pool was to have its orders executed by 
numerous difterent brokers, who might not themselves have under-
stood the part they played in the whole. Now this subtertuge 
is unavailing. 
Thus, two clever but simple rules have in great measure 
achieved what the Hughes Commission ardently desired but was 
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unable to accomplish -- the distinguishing of beneficial 
speculation from that which (in intention at least) is practic-
ally gambling, and the protection of the one and the elimination 
of the other. 
The SEC 11kewise made rulings to cover all other undesir-
able practices upon the exchange, but these had already been 
pretty well covered by existing state laws aa well aa by the 
regulations of the various exchanges themselves. "Wash sales" 
(i.e., a fictitious sale by a broker to himselt for the purpose 
of publicizing an artificial price), for example, are very easy 
to detect aad eliminate. "Matched orders" (i.e., two orders 
given to different brokers by one and the same person for the 
same purpose as a wash sale) are more difficult to detect, par-
ticularly in an inactive market; but the incentives for using 
such methods are largely removed by closer regulation ot the 
original security iasues, in connection with which it is desir-
able to maintain an artifiCially high price on the exchange for 
the purpose of establishing an "over-the-counter" (non-exchange) 
sale price for unsuspecting investors. For the latter are 
always qUite willing to bU7 stock directly from a dealer at a 
price which they see publicized in stock exchange quotations, 
thereby aaving the broker's commission. 
Probably the greatest general reform made by the SEC is the 
publication of financial and operating reports required of ever, 
corporat~oD Whose stock is widely distributed among the public. 
Elaborate regulations were made to bring to light everything 
S8 
which might be ot value to the investor. The SEC itself does 
not undertake to publicize all the intormation it receives, but 
it does respond to ever7 request; and hence current data are to 
be had b7ever7 interested investor at an7. good llbrary, bank, 
or brokerage house through the instramentalit7 ot such tinaacial 
servlces as M~odl's, poor's, and standard statistics. Toda7 at 
11 
last, the "lmpubllcit7" which Protessor Riple7 decrled so vehe-
ment17 and just17 is a thing ot the past tor a1'17 investor who 
will go to the alight trouble ot examining the published recorda 
Although the stock exchange had already shown the wa7, and 
still turnishes valuable cooperation, most ot this publiclt7 is 
required through the provislons ot the Seourities Aot rather 
than the Securities Exchange Act. Because ot this tact, and 
also because ot the ~iad complexit7 ot the rulea, no turther 
anallais ot this aspect of the question will be made here. 
Indeed, such an examination could well turn into a length7 
treatlse on the ethics of aocountant ... report. 11'1 relatlon to 
the investlng publlc. 
11 Ope clt., Chapter VII, "Impubllolt7: What To Do about It." 
CHAPTER IV 
SOME LARGER ASPECTS OF REGULATION 
Even though 1t be reasonably clear that the stock exchange 
is a necessary inst1tution and that its more flagrant abuses 
have been cleared up~ there still remains the fact that it seems 
to have subordinated its primary function to the wholly secon-
dary one of speculat10n. The primary purpose of the exchange 1s 
to provide a market tor corporation securities so that pr1ces to 
investora may be arrived at in a tree and open manner, and with 
full informat1on as to market conditions available to all part1-
cipanta. In tcn-warding these ends the New York Stock Exchange 
has been unt1ring1y aggressive. l Nor 1s 1t to be denied that 
speculation must playa large part in such a central market. 
Altred .arshall~ tor example, asserts that --
It has been we1l observed that a speculator~ 
who without manipulating prices by false 
intelligence or otherWise, anticipates the 
tuture correctly, and who makes gains by 
shrewd purchases and sales on the Stock 
Exchange ••• generally renders a public ser-
v1ce by pushing forward production where it 
is wanted and repressing it where it is not.2 
Here, however, it must be noted that speculation on the exchange 
doe. not directly react upon production by immediately supplying 
the corporations concerned with new cap1tal to extend their 
1 ct. H. S. Martin, The New York Stock Exc~e, New York, 1919, 
Chapter 22, 8The Eiin&nge as-a Mora! Force. 
2 Principles ~ Economica, Macmillan and Co., London, 1930, 8th 
Edition, 432, n. 39 
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plants and facilitIes, for such trading is merely in stock 
that has already been issued and fully paId for. Any gain from 
a rIse in price is receIved by the indivIdual holder of the 
stock, and Dot by the issuing company. But a rising market for 
any particular company's stock would enable It to issue new se-
curities, whether bonds or stocks, more readily and easily, in 
larger amounts. and on better terms for its own ~1nancial inter-
est than it would if the publicity of the exchange were lacking. 
And, as Professor Bye says, 
A uae~ul adjunct to both investment and com-
mercial banking is the stock exchanges •••• 
Investors would be reluctant to put their 
money into stocks or bonds' if there were 
no machinery for selling them later If de-
sired. Moreover, by finding a market for 
older issues, underwriters can sometimes 
get their customers to buy new issues which 
the former are trying to dispose of. 3 
Thus the exchange supplies the publicity and ready market which 
even the "permanent" investor looks for in buying any securIt7. 
As an illustration of the common estimation of the desirabilIty 
of thIs lIlting ot a security, the "spread" in price between a 
lIsted and an unlisted bond of the same compan7 and the same 
security is sometimes a couple of points. 
Then too, it must be remembered that speculation makes for 
a larger and more active market, and that 
----------.. 
The larger the market for a commodity the 
smaller general17 are the fluctuations in 
its price, and the lower is the percentage 
on the turnover which dealers charge for 
doIng business in it. 4 
3 Ope cit .• , 211. 
4 Alfred Marshall. OPe cit~. 328, 
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Although the first part of the statement is open to challenge, 
since speculation is commonl7 blamed for the violent fluctua-
tions of stock prices, yet the second part is abundant17 true. 
The purchase, for example, of a hundred shares of stock selling 
anywhere between a hundred and two hundred dollars a share would 
cost on17 twenty-five dollars -- on a contract amounting to any-
thing less thaD twenty thousand do11arsl This commission 
amounts to no more than a quarter of one per cent; a like rate 
in the real estate business would put all the realtors out of 
business in short order. Of course, they perfform functions 
which the stock broker does not, but that is the advantage of 
the central market. 
Another aid which speculation gives the investor, especi-
ally the small one, is in the purchase and sale of "odd lots" 
(i.e., fewer than a hundred shares). Up until the middle of the 
twenties, most odd lots used to be handled on the Consolidated 
Stock Exchange, since defunct, but after that time all such 
orders bave been taken care of by an elaborate machinery on the 
exchange itself, without, however, the investorts losing the 
benefi~s of small commissions. There are two large houses in 
New York City which deal exclusively in odd lota, and to whom 
all other brokers turn over their orders. These orders are not 
actually executed on the floor of the Exchange, but are grouped, 
cancelled out whenever pOSSible, and "traded against" on the 
Exchange. The customer submitting the order is guaranteed a 
price of an eighth (or sometimes a quarter) of a point away from 
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the next round lot sale which takes place after his order 
has been received. This means that if he is buying stock he 
paya an eighth ot a, point more than the next sale printed on the 
ticker tape, or if he is selling he receives an eighth of a 
pOint less. The reason for trading exclusively in round lots on 
the "floor" is quite apparent from the daily volume ot business, 
but the rule does leave a huge problem to be solved. The odd 
lot houses were formed to take up the challehge, and have 
handled it very satisfactorily. Since they guarantee prices 
based upon the next sale, they are continuously both "long" and 
"short· stock, which they must sell or buy in as best they can. 
Obviously, such a business can be conducted only on a large 
scale, and that is why there are only two houses handling all 
the odd lot business. If these houses were not allowed to sell 
short and to speculate in buying stock, the small investor would 
have to lose two or three pOints, instead ot an eighth, in buy-
ing or selling his odd lot. 
Here again, a speculative market is a means of placing the 
small man more nearly on a par with the wealthy capitalist. In 
tact, in a rising market the small buyer has a distinct advan-
tage: he is practically guaranteed the next sale, whereas a 
large order would have to wait its turn and pay a higher price. 
But in spite of these very obvious services of speculation 
in the cause of permanent and sound investment, it is maintained 
that speculation on the stock exchanges of the country, and of 
the world, has expanded beyond all reason, and has come so to 
dominate these markets that they seem to have lost their pri-
mary function ot oenters of investment and to have turned into 
5 glorified gambling dens. There can be little doubt that this 
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charge has a tirm foundation in fact, although the extent to 
which speculation dominates the exchange cannot be ascertained 
with any degree of accuracy. However, the eminent authority of 
John Moody lends weight to the opposite opinion in the statement 
that "a greater sum of money is annually lost in this country 
through unwise investment in Wall street, than through pure 
speculation."S 
At this point it would be well to try to distinguish the 
various types ot speculative dealings to be found in general us 
First of all, the speculator must be distinguished from the in-
vestor. The latter buys a stock for a relatively long term, and 
more with a view to the income to be derived from it than tor 
any antiolpation of selling it at an increase in price. The 
speculator, on the other hand, buys stock for the "short turn" 
solely with a view to selling it at a higher price. But this 
"short turn" may vary trom a few minutes to several years, de-
pending upon whether the buyer is a long-term speculator or a 
."specialist" who happens to be "making a market" in the particu-
~ .. --------
5 Another serious charge against stock market speculation is 
that it ties up huge amounts ot capital in the form of brokers' 
loans, thereby withdrawing it from production. This question 
is thoroughly discussed in Horace White's .one~ and Banking, 
Ginn and Co., Boston, 1925, New Edition by c. .~ppets and 
L. A. Froman, S12 sq. Since prominent authorities are cited 
for contradictory views, and since the authors espouse neither 
aide, the matter will not be considered in this thesis. 
S The ~ !! !!!! street Investing, Moody Corp., New York, 1906, 
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lar stock he is handling. III putting an ethical evaluation 
upon speculatlve transactlons, then, there occurs the dlfflculty 
which long ago confronted the Hughes Commisslon -- the separa-
tion of that which is good from what ~s practically gambling. 
The long-term speculator may generally be admitted to pertorm a 
useful economic service in directing the flow ot capital, as was 
previously indicated. It may be argued, too, that the two-min-
ute speculator may pertorm an equally useful service. If, for 
example, an order comes to the floor ot the New York Stock Ex-
change to sell a thousand shares ot u. S. Steel "at the market" 
(i.e., at the best price obtainable at the moment) at a time 
when there are tew buying orders at hand, the seller would stand 
little chance of getting a good price unless there were specu-
lators at the post. Large blocks of stocks held by 1nvestors 
must frequently be sold on short notice When neither the owner 
nor his broker would be capable of dlrect supervision in secur-
ing a good price. However, in every active stock there are al-
ways a tew speculators, floor-brokers and speciallsts, who know 
the ordinary demand and supply ot that particular stock. So, 
when a large selling order comes in a weak market, they bid 
against eaCh other to get it, knowing that in all probability 
they will be able to dispose of it at a small profit within a 
tew hours. The proti t taken may be only an eighth or a quarter 
ot a pOint, but it the operation is repeated often enough, as it 
is, a good living can be made from this practice. 
Such speculation, though in no wise long-term, should be 
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clasaitied as beneticial, since it is essential to the main-
tenance ot a ateady market. Likewise, the similar "in and out" 
technique ot the odd lot dealer reacts decidedly to the advan-
tage ot the bona tide lnvestor. And it otten happens that stock 
--
bought tor long-term investment is sold within a shart time be-
cause the owner thinks that it has rlsen above what lt is worth, 
and thereupon decides to take a speculator's profit, or because 
he reallzes he made a poor choice. 
The thing ~ch ultimately puts speculation in the category 
ot good or bad is the intention ot the speculator, but slnce 
regulation could scarcely be undertaken on that baSiS, other 
norms Will have to be applied. The simplest and most obvious 
course to pursllB-: in the elimination ot evil speculation, the 
kind which rests upon vague rumors, "tips", and manipulation, 
would be to close down the stock exchanges tmmediatelyand com-
pletely. While such a course has been openly advocated by very 
tew, it would seem to be implied in the condemnations generally 
" " meted out to the exchange •• sgr. Ryan, tor example, in'a resume
ot his analysis says --
Speculation as an institution is ot doubttul 
utility; socially lt ls productive ot great 
and widespread evils; and morally it is vi-
tiated by a very considerable amount ot dis-
honest "deals" and practices. 7 
Likewise, Fr. Slater cites with approval the suppression ot 
8 
speculation on the Berlin Stock Exchange. 
-----------7 Ope Cit., 528. 
8 Rev. T. Slater, S.J., ·Speculation", ~ Catholic Encycloped1~ 
XIV, 211. 
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But the Berlin stock Exchange is a ease in point which 
shows the futility and positive harm which follows strict and 
repressive measures. In justice to the German economists of the 
time, it must be said that a commission of investigation had 
turned in a moderate report, similar in tone to that of the 
Hughes COmmission in this country, but the agrarian Reichstag 
took matters into its own hands and formulated the Bourse Law 
of 1896. The etfect ot the prohibition ot ordinary speculation 
on the Exchange was to drive it into "underground" channels, 
where it flourished in a more evil manner than ever. Protessor 
Emery enumerates a number of disastrous ettects, among which 
were the toll owing 
(1) Fluctutations in prices have been increased 
rather than decreased. The corrective influence 
ot the bear side ot the market having been re-
stricted, the tendency to an inflated bull 
movement was increased in times ot prosperity. 
(2) 'rhe money market has been increasingly 
demoralized through the greater tluctuations 
in demand tor tunds to carry speculative 
cash accounts. 
(3) Finally, the ettect ot interterence, 
increased cost, and legal uncertainty was to 
drive business to toreign exchanges. The 
number ot agencies ot toreign houses increased 
tour or five told, and much German capital 
tlowed into other centera, especially London, 
tor investment or speculation. 9 
Ten years atter the enactment ot the original legislation a 
Government commission was forced to admit that --
The dangers ot speculation have been increased, 
_ .... __ ...... _--.. _--
9 Henry Crosby Emerl' "!en Years' Regulation ot the stock Ex-
change in Germany , ~ !!!! Review, May, 1908. 
the power of the market to resist one-sided 
movements has been weakened, and the possi-
bilities ot using inside information have 
been enlarged. 10 
4'7 
Acting upon the recommendations of this report, the Reichstag 
repealed most ot the provisions relating to trade in stocks, but 
still retained the prohibition against short selling in grain 
and flour until the continued disastrous result. proved beyond 
question its futility. 
As there are no open markets for these products 
and no continuous quotations, both buyera and 
sellers are at a disadvantage; prices are more 
fluctuating than they were befere the passage 
ot the law against short selling. 11 
The On17 experience ot this country in a similar matter oc-
curred during the Civil War. 
When the greenbacks became the regular mone'1 
ot the count~, there was established in the 
city ot New York a "gold exchange", a spec-
ulative market where people met dail'1 to buy 
and sell gold ••• As the greenbacks depreci-
ated, there were great complaints about the 
high price of gold, and man,. people charged 
that the speculation on the gold exchange 
was responsible... Congress gave ear to the 
complaints and passed a law abolishing the 
gold exchange and forbidding all speculative 
dealings in gold. The result was immediate 
and disastrous. Nobody knew where he could 
get gold or sell gold or what the price waa ••• 
Instead there was bargaining and higgling at 
various places, and wide1,. differing prices 
were quoted in ditferent places. The price, 
instead of falling as hoped, immediately rose 
higher than ever... The demand for the re-
storation of the exchange was so prompt and 
so strong that Congress repealed the law just 
two weeks atter its passage. 12 
-_ .. _-------_ .... 
10 Ibid., 240 
11 Hughes Commission Report, quoted in VanAntwerp, OPe cit., 44~ 
12 Fairchild, Furniss, and Buck, OPe cit., 90. 
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The flrst polntto be noted about these two unsuccessful ex-
perlments 1. that the free and open market of the organlzed ex-
change was replaced b~ an under-cover and disorganized one where 
fraud was ea.~ to perpetrate and hard to dlscover and rectif~. 
8econdl~,price fluctuations in Wheat in Germany became more 
violent, and the price of gold in this count17 went still higher. 
And it was the exact opposite of these effects that the respec-
tive lawa were intended to accomplish. 
With regard to the first point, the fundamental fact Which 
the legislators overlooked is that wherever large numbers of 
people are interested in buying and selling a homogeneous com-
modity, there will not onl~ be created markets for thatcommod-
lty, but they will all tend to gravltate to one central place, 
Where, because of the large volume of business, the market will 
become highly organized and complex, and its operatlons open and 
public. And that is exactly the case with the stock market. In 
splte of it. external similarity to a gambling casino, it is a 
natural and inevitable result of fundamental economic tendendles 
where free men are allowed to use their money as their own. 
Throughout thls discusslon it is very important to keep in mind 
that the argument is not that stock exchange operations are 
ethical because they are ineVitable, but rather that, being in 
themselves indifferent, they serve the public interest When con-
ducted as they are. To close down or cripple the present work 
of the stock exchanges would be to open the door to prlvate vice 
and public disaster. 
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As to the effect upon prices of organized and unorganized 
markets, the two cases cited do not prove anything conclusively. 
The rise in gold prlces subsequent to the c~oslng ot the excnAn~ 
was due prlnclpally to other factors, such as tear inspired by 
the drastlc move, and by the lncreaslngly grave tlnancia~ sltua-
tlon ot the government. But the vlo1ent fluctuatlon ot graln 
prices atter the restrictions ln Germanrwouldaeem to lndicate 
some stabillzing influence on the part of tree speculatlon on an 
organlzed market. In this ease, the complete and tull dissemin-
ation ot news and the openness ot tradlng atforded by an ex-
change had not been lost; what was lacking was the discountlng 
ot the ~uture by "tutures" tradlng and the restoring ettect ot 
short 8elllng. Contlnuous trading ln tutures have the advantage 
ot keeping betore the eyes ot the large graln consumers the ne-
cessit7 ot spreadlng a definitely 11mited supply ot grain over 
a whole year's consumptlon, and thU8 tending to even out tluc-
tuations trom month to month. 
So much has been said about the practice ot breaking the 
market by short selling that its more ordinary use is apt to be 
overlooked. Since so to break the market i8 dangerou8 and re-
qulres large stores ot capltal, the common use ot short selling 
is merely to protit by selling at the top and buying back at the 
bottom. When a market declines rapidly, there is always a con-
siderable "short interest" which is looking tor a chance "to 
take a protit" by bUJing back, and this short interest is the 
only thing which makes possible any market at all on day8 ot 
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real panic, such as the worat days ot 1929. During these times, 
when everyone waa trying to dispose ot stock as fast as he could 
do so, there was not a single issue tor which as many buyers 
could not be found as there were sellera. ot course, the sel-
lers had to take greatly reduced prices, but that was better 
than being torced to hold, as many real estate investors were 
obliged to do, for lack of buyers at any price. How much ot 
this "support" in the market was due to the short interest, is 
still a aecret, and will probably always remain so, but it i& 
believed to have been the major part. 
Prom all this might be drawn the following conclusion --
that the abolition of the exchange is impossible and undesirabl~ 
and that any regulation or legal restriction which drives busi-
ness ott the regular exchange deteats its own purpose. But it~ 
ia equally clear that the exchange must be subject to constant 
and close surveillance and regulation to curb the inevitable 
tendency to over-speculation. This regulation should take on a 
twofold torm -- blanket rules designed to discourage too-expan-
sive tendencies, and certain discretionary powers suitable for 
coping with evasive practices. In this country the former have 
been supplied by the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange 
Act, and wide discretionary powers are in the hands ot the SEC. 
An idea ot the extent to which speculation has been curbed by 
these acts may be gained trom the tollowing table. It may be 
objected that other forces were at work also, and no doubt this 
is true. But there were torces working in both directions, and 
there seems to be no good reason tor ascribing the cause to 
anything else than governmental regulation. 
TOTAL SALES ON THE N. Y. STOCK EXCHANGE 13 
(in millions ot shares) 
1925 - 452 1934 - 324 
1926 - 449 1935 - 382 
1927 - 577 1936 - 496 
1928 - 921 1937 - 410 
1929 - 1125 1938 - 298 
1930 - 810 1939 - 258 
1931 - 577 1940 - 208 
1932 - 425 1941 - 167 
1933 - 655 1942 - 124 
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From this table it will be seen that when regulation began 
in 1934, total yearly sales were cut more than halt, and that 
the "boom" year ot 1936 scarcely brought trading up to the level 
ot what brokers called the exceedingly dull years ot 1931 and 
1932. Added to this is the much lower level of stock prices, 
which makes the total dollar~volume ot speculation much smaller. 
And, whatever, may be the cause, the American public has en-
tirely lost its stock market "craze", and is no longer dominated 
by that "get rich quick with no work" mentality, which was the 
greatest evil, public or p~1vate, which the stock exchange ever 
had a hand in. 
However, it may possibly be argued whether or not even this 
large reduction has brought speculation within reasonable bounds, 
and it at some time in the tuture a state ot prosperity and un-
warrented optimism should again prevail, what guarantee is there 
.. --_ .. ------
13 World Almanac, ~, New York World Telegram, 427. 
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that the present s7stem ot regulation will be able to cope with 
it? In that case full reliance must be placed on the.wisdom and 
integrity of the members ot the SEC. On a rising market th87 
can impose the restriction ot ~gher margin and moderate use of 
the short sale, and to a declining market they can giTe the sup-
port of a reverse procedure. Moreover, manipulation on a large 
scale can be prev.ented by prompt investigation and energetic 
prosecution. What has been done up to the present in this matt 
is not definite17 clear, since the SEC reports cover its admin-
istration ot several acts besides the Securities Exchange Act, 
but up to June 30, 1940 it had conducted 6,65~ lnvestigations, 
indicted 1,300 persons, and convicted 542.14 
The indivldual states, especially New York, can and have 
curbed speculation indlrect17 by a judicious s7stem ot transter 
and other taxes. The heavy transter tax now in force makes 
tradlng for the &hort term leiS profitable, and hence less com-
mon, and a tax on short stock tends to reduce the feequency ot 
short sales. A suggestion that state laws be passed prohiblting 
the resale of stock within a short time is full ot possibilitie 
If correctly drawn up, it should discourage, if not eliminate, 
that trading tor the "&hort swing" which is practically gambling 
However, exceptions would have to be made tor the odd-lot broker, 
who in the daily non-speculative conduct ot his business makes 
more "speculative" commitments than anyone else. Likewlse, it 
14 ~ Work ~ ~ Securities and Exchange Commission, U. S. 
Government Prlnting Ottice, Washington, 1940, 14. 
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possible, the present "market-making" activities of the special-
ist should not be interfered with. In any case, no legislation 
should be attempted without thorough investigation and expert 
testimony, and perhaps a preliminary period of trial. 
The point to be kept in mind at the end of this discussion, 
is that the nation has progressed a long way since the day- ot 
1929. Each step in the curbing of speculation has been slow, 
methodical, and successful. There will, no doubt, have to be 
further legislation in the same direction, but it should be done 
at the same pace and in the same manner as that put through in 
the thirties. 
CONCLUSION 
The aim of this thesis has been to separate the component 
elements which go to make up the ethical constitution of the 
stock exchange, to examine each of them separately, and thus t~ 
avoid the common practice, and resulting oonfusion of judgment, 
of trying to evaluate the complex institution of stock specu-
lation !! globo. In the first ~apter, the exohange was con-
sidered merely as a market, and was shown to be a natural and 
inevitable tendency because of the homogeneity of shares of 
stock. A single national market also led to the formation of a 
monopolistic assooiation with a highly oomplex organization, 
which is a remarkably near approach to the "perfect market" 
ideal of the economist. The second ohapter undertakes to ex-
plain the nature of margin trading and short selling, and tries 
to tree them of the mystery and prejudice in which they are 
generally shrouded. Margin trading is seen to be no different, 
tundamentally, from the purohase ot real estate, or any other 
commodity, on a mortgage or time payments. And short selling, 
although it is dangerous because of the open door it leaves to 
abuses, is also based on familiar and generally accepted prin-
ciples of contract or trade. 
However, in spite of the legitimacy of the exchange and 1 
approved practices when Viewed in themselves, there remains the 
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~act that speculation has run rampant to such an extent that 
public authority has, upon various occasions, deemed it neces-
sary to intervene. The ~irst thorough investigation was that 
ot the Hughes Commission of 1909, which found grave abuses, es-
pecially in the overexpansion of speculation, but admitted it-
self unable to eli~nate them without unduly penalizing legiti-
mate traders. It contented itself with oalling upon the New 
York Stock Exohange itself' to take the situation in hand and 
remedy it. It remained for the Roosevelt administration o~ 
1932 to formulate laws which would ingeniously eliminate the 
undesirable elements without too muoh curtailing the ~reedom of 
the market. 
Since there has been serious advocation o~ the total abo-
lition of speculation, the ~ourth chapter examines the experi-
ence of Germany in its drastic regulation of the Berlin stock 
Exchange late in the last century, and of the United states in 
its attempt to prohibit speculation in gold during the Civil 
War. Both of these etfort. only increased the violence of 
price changes and offered cover for dishonest practices, show-
ing that legislation may easily aggravate the situation by be-
coming too drastic. The SEC, on the other hand, has cut down 
trading on the New York Stock Exchange by one-half or more, 
without driving it either abroad Cas happened in Germany) or to 
under-cover operation <as was the case with gold in this country 
during the Civil War). Individual states have also helped to 
discourage speculation and the rapid turnover o~ securities by 
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b7 heavy transfer and other taxes. 
But in spite of all this, there ma7 still be good reason 
to doubt whether or not the stock exchanges of the countr7 pro-
duce more good effects than evil ones. If stocks are bought as 
investments, their resale should be the exception rather than 
the rule, and the figures on the turnover of stock shares show 
that this is obviously not the case. Some prOVision for a mar-
ket should exist, but the exchange seems based on the principle 
that speculative purchases of shares should predominate. But 
what can be done about it? The experience of h1stor~ dictates 
strongl~ against total abolition, or even drastic regulation. 
Such procedure is worse than no regulation at all, because it 
must soon be reversed, and gives the supporters of the stock 
exchange a talking point strong enough to block all further 
attempts at retorm. 
Perhaps the best place to start would be with the individ 
al investor. What institution should undertake to give him a 
slightly less gullible attitude toward the stock exchange is 
highly problematical, but .that the average investor and specu-
lator needs education and an infusion of prudence is abundantly 
evident. When the United States went oft the gold standard, 
there was an immediate rush to buy the gold stocks, among them 
the Yukon Gold Mining Co., and it was not until much later that 
man7 hasty investors found out that the Alaskan properties of 
that company had long ceased to yield any gold, and that the 
firm had moved# lock,'stock, and barrel, over the Pacific to 
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mine tin in Malaya. Likewise, some people bought Seaboard 
Air Line (R.R.) under the impression that it was operating air-
planes, or Cord Corporation under the illusion that it was man-
ufacturing the Cord automobile, wheras it was really a holding 
compan}' for Auburn (which made the Cord car) and other smaller 
properties. To everyone of these investors information, com-
plete and accurate and up-to-date, was easily available, if 
only he had the initiative to look for it. No doubt the bro-
kers concerned might have been at fault in some instances, but 
it is not generally politic, or even polite, to ask a customer 
it he knows what he is doing. And all reputable houses main-
tain an expensive information bureau for the free use of their 
customers. 
Next to the investing and speculating publiC, the ones who 
could do most to reform the stock exchange are the members and 
brokers themselves. Already the various exchanges of the coun-
try have done much to inculcate a public spirit in their mem-
bers, but among men who are intent upon making their fortune by 
their unaided efforts and skill, selfish individualism has a 
strong and tenacious hold. But there is no reason to doubt 
that conditions will improve gradually, if slowly, especially 
under pressure from the SEC. 
l!'t is with the SEC itself that lies the greatest hope for 
immediate improvement. The provisions of the various acts 
which it administers are cleverly contrived, and its own dis-
cretionary powers are sufficiently wide to handle an}' eventual-
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ity. What specific new regulations should be made it would 
be difficult to indicate at this time. The most desirable 
would seem to be a requirement that every share of stock be 
held· a certain length of time before it could be sold, thus 
eliminating that "in and out" speculation which is the most 
wasteful and detrimental. But, as indicated in Chapter IV, a 
blanket rule would work hardships on the smaller investors. who 
need consideration most of all. Perhaps the good effects would 
outweigh the evil. but at least extensive studies should be 
made before any legislation is enacted. 
In all regulation a cardinal point should be consideration 
tor persons and attitudes. It the SEC can gain the good will 
ot the brokers and investing public. its rules and regulations 
will become etfective; if not, they can be large17 evaded. The 
broker and professional trader must be impressed with his civic 
responsibility. and the investor with the prinCiple that real 
wealth is produced by labor and not by lucky speculation. Such 
education is necessarily slow and incomplete, like most other 
education, but there is no reason for not trying to impart it. 
Nor must it be forgotten what has already been done. Wit& 
in ten years the New York Stock Exchange has been reduced trom 
a much-publicized institution on which millions of people hoped 
and expected to gain their fortune, and which required the ser-
vices of thousands of workers, to its present-day status ot a 
halt-forgotten adjunct to the nation's economic life, Whose 
broker-members must constantly cut their staffs and merge their 
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firms in order to stay in business at all. In contrast to 
the first World War. the present conflict has taken the insti-
tution of organized spe.culation out of the public eye, and haa 
pushed it further and further back into the realm ot oblivion 
until there can hardly be said to be a contemporary stock ex-
ohange problem at all. But unle'ss the government of America 
goes over to some form of state sooialism, the problem is sure 
to arise again, as it did in the twenties, but the next time 
will find the nation ready for it, having profited by its pre-
vious experience and having at hand the means to cope with the 
situation. 
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